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Viewing cable 03KUWAIT4680, C) GOK SEES STRONG SAUDI COMMITMENT AGAINST

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others.
See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #[03KUWAIT4680](#).

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
03KUWAIT4680	2003-10-14 12:19	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Kuwait

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10172>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10173>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10175>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10187>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10176>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10177>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10184>
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<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10179>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10180>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10181>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10183>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10174>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 004680

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2013
TAGS: [PREL](#) [SA](#) [KU](#)
SUBJECT: (C) GOK SEES STRONG SAUDI COMMITMENT AGAINST
TERRORISM

Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D)

[¶1.](#) (C) SUMMARY: The GOK assesses that key Saudi leaders Prince Sultan and Prince Nayif have become strongly committed against terrorism since the May 12 Riyadh attacks. END SUMMARY.

[¶2.](#) (C) NEA PDAS Larocco called on Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid al-Hamad al-Sabah, Chairman of Kuwait's National Security Bureau, October 13, during a brief visit to Kuwait. This message reports what Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid (protect throughout) had to say about Saudi Arabia (other topics septels).

[¶3.](#) (C) Sabah al-Khalid said that since the May 12 Riyadh attacks, the Saudi leadership -- i.e. senior members of the

ruling family -- had finally concluded that terrorism represented a direct threat to the family. Neither Defense Minister Prince Sultan nor Interior Minister Prince Nayif had, until then. Both had accommodated extremists, in order to keep peace; they had never admitted that their own ranks contained extremists in key positions. Now they do admit it, and have taken decisive action. It is a big job, and the Saudi leaders understand they will suffer additional casualties, but the Kuwaiti leadership believes the Saudis will press on systematically, purging the ranks of the military, National Guard and Ministry of Interior, while working to provide direct guidance to imams for their Friday sermons.

¶4. (U) Ambassador Larocco was the source of this message, but did not have time to clear the cable itself.

¶5. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
JONES